

Capital Based Macroeconomics: Boom and Bust in Japan and the U.S.

John P. Cochran and Noah Yetter

Metropolitan College of Denver

[cochranj@mscd.edu](mailto:cochranj@mscd.edu)

yettern@mscd.edu

303-556-3218

303-556-3966 (fax)

Fred R. Glahe

Fred.glahe@colorado.edu

University of Colorado-Boulder

**CAPITAL-BASED MACROECONOMICS:  
BOOM AND BUST IN JAPAN AND THE U.S.**

**John P. Cochran and Noah A. Yetter**

**(Metropolitan State College of Denver)**

**Fred R. Glahe**

**(University of Colorado-Boulder)**

**ABSTRACT**

*Roger Garrison (2001) developed a diagrammatical framework that elaborated and updated the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory. This capital-based macroeconomics better integrates time and money in a macroeconomic model and provides a link between the short run and the long run. Cochran (2001) and Cochran, Call, and Glahe (2003) developed a theoretical framework for a boom-bust cycle that is a combination of sustainable growth caused by a productivity shock and unsustainable growth generated by credit creation. This paper applies the theory to the boom-bust episodes in Japan in the 1980s and the U.S. in the late 1990s and concludes that while both economies were influenced by a money and credit induced boom-bust, the Japanese experience was initiatory, the boom was initiated by a Bank of Japan money and credit expansion, while the boom-bust in the U.S. fits the reactive policy case, a productivity shock accommodated by money and credit expansion.*

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Some economists and the financial press believe that the U.S. in the 1990s and Japan in the 1980s experienced economic growth driven by a positive productivity shock.

The economic growth was accompanied by growth of money and credit aggregates. Proponents of real business cycle theory considered the money growth benign, while adherents of the natural rate theory viewed it as beneficial because either the price level was stable or inflation rates were extremely low. A capital-based macroeconomics shows how and why the accompanying growth of money and credit with or without declining interest rates was neither beneficial nor benign. Credit creation sets up the economy for a boom and eventual bust. In the case, first of Japan and then the U.S., the ‘boom’ was followed by a ‘bust’ in their respective asset markets and the real sectors of the economy. *The Economist* (September 28, 2002, 9) made just such a connection in its interpretation of recent economic history of the U.S. and Japan.

The recent business cycle in both America and Japan displayed many “Austrian” features. Hayek argued that the natural rate of interest could rise if faster productivity growth increased expectations about profits and hence investment opportunities. This is what happened in Japan in the 1980s and in America in the 1990s. If such a shift in investment occurs, *central banks need to raise interest rates* [emphasis ours]. But because inflation was low (and because Austrian economics had long gone out of fashion), the Fed and the Bank of Japan failed to do so. The cost of capital fell below its expected return, fuelling a surge in credit, equity prices and investment.

Does the actual data in both cases support such an interpretation? Table one presents data for the Japan and table two similar data for the United States.

[Tables 1 and 2]

The data for Japan appears compatible with an interpretation of a productivity shock to the economy around 1984 to 1985. Inflation rates were extremely low (by recent standards) and actually fell from 1984 to 1987. Monetary growth numbers and the reported long term interest rate indicate that, not only did the Bank of Japan not allow

interest rates to increase, but actually increased the rate of growth of money and credit sufficiently to put downward pressure on interest rates. The data for the U.S. is, perhaps, even more consistent with the interpretation of *The Economist*. The evidence for a productivity shock around 1995 includes increases in the rates of growth of Real GDP and labor productivity as in the Japanese case. Additional evidence for a productivity shock is provided by a revision of the rate of growth of natural GDP from 2.7% to 3.2% in 1996 and to 3.5% thereafter. Inflation rates in the relevant period (post 1995) stay between 1.2% and 2.2 % (measured by the GDP price deflator). The reported nominal interest rate remains stable or falls through 1998 and remains below the 1995 level until 2000. M2 growth rate accelerates beginning in 1996, slowing slightly after 1999.

Capital-based macroeconomics and the concepts of sustainable and unsustainable growth developed by Roger Garrison (2001) provide an explanation of business cycle phenomena that is consistent with the above data and with the stylized facts of business cycles as presented by Romer (2001, 170). These stylized facts are treated as the thing to be explained in the real business cycle literature. In this paper, we will provide the capital-based or Austrian explanation of these stylized facts. After developing the underlying theory and discussing how the theory is consistent with the general facts related to business cycles, we will use a variation of the Austrian or capital-based model (Cochran, Call, and Glahe 2003) in an attempt to show in more detail how the capital-based explanation is consistent with the 1990s boom-bust in the U.S. and the 1980s boom and 1990s stagnation in Japan.

## II. MODEL

Prescott (1986, 10) makes the case that the application of the term business cycle to describe the observed movements is ‘unfortunate’ — economists mistakenly attempt to explain cycle phenomena independently from the growth component. The phenomena are better understood by the use of a unified theory of growth and fluctuations. In a shock interpretation (real business cycle) of the economic data, the trend line is a statistical construct; the peaks, valleys and the associated changes in growth rates would be, in effect, optimal adjustments of the economy to a series of technology or productivity shocks (Prescott 1986). There would thus be higher or lower levels of real GDP and associated growth rates.

Mises and Hayek took a similar methodological approach – a single unified economic theory. But in a capital-based macroeconomics the theory explains not only fluctuations, but also boom-bust phenomena. Hayek (1933, 55-6) differentiates cycles from adjustments to shocks:

The simple fact that economic development does not go on quite uniformly, but periods of relatively rapid change alternate with periods of relative stagnation, does not in itself constitute a problem. It is sufficiently explained by the adjustments of the economic system to irregular changes in the data - changes whose occurrence we always have to assume and which cannot be further explained by economic science.

and

The phenomena of the upward trend of the trade cycle and of the culminating boom constitute a problem only because they inevitably bring about a slump in sales -i.e., a falling-off of economic activity - which is not occasioned by any corresponding change in the original economic data.

A capital-based macroeconomic model helps one understand the myriad number of separate but interrelated decisions that determines a long-run growth pattern, changes in the long-run pattern, and output fluctuations. Growth is not automatic in any economy. There is no mystical long run trend. Continuing growth depends not only on countless number of decisions by numerous economic agents, but depends also critically on continuous saving by capitalists — the continuous reinvestment of a significant portion of the proceeds of business back into the business enterprise (Cochran and Glahe 1999, 114-17). Growth rates and the level of productive activity vary and fluctuate in response to shocks as suggested by the real business cycle literature.

Boom-bust cycles can develop around the shifting growth paths. The misdirections of production associated with credit creation and the associated boom-bust cycle alter both the structure of production and period of provision. A starting point for this capital-based interpretation of the growth/cycle interaction is Garrison's (2001) concept of sustainable versus unsustainable growth. In a capital-based macroeconomics, sustainable growth occurs when investment exceeds depreciation and is financed by available saving (Garrison 2001, 63-67). Growth is sustainable because it is consistent with preferences and resource availability. Regardless of its actual rate, such growth should be of no concern to monetary policy makers, particularly those concerned with accelerating inflation. Sustainable growth in a sound money environment or under a policy regime following a productivity norm should be accompanied by declining prices.<sup>1</sup> Sustainable growth may be pictured as a continuous outward shift of the Production

---

<sup>1</sup> See particularly the recent article "Money, Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Global Financial Arena" by Jerry Jordan (2001), President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. George Selgin made a

Possibility Frontier and a loanable funds market in equilibrium. The interest rate in the loanable funds market must be consistent with the broader time market represented by the margin between input prices and expected future output prices. Such growth may be sustainable if the dynamics continue to favor investment in excess of depreciation while also being consistent with preferences and resource availability.

Sustainable growth does not imply a fixed long-term rate of growth. Any stylized trend picked up in the data would, as in the real business cycle case, be “defined by the computational procedure used to fit a smooth curve to the data” (Prescott 1986, 10). The actual data and associated fluctuations would be the result of and part of a historical process that results from a “dynamic coordination of entrepreneurial plans with historical development of time preferences, the size and quality of the labor force, natural resource endowments, and technological progress” (Salerno 2001, p. 60).

How does a capital-based approach differ from a real business cycle approach? The data presented in the real business cycle literature can be used as an exercise in ‘interpretive economic history’ (Higgs, 1995) to illustrate the relevance of capital-based business cycle theory. Real business cycle theorists see the pattern of expansion and contraction present in economic data as the economy’s response to exogenous productivity shocks. These “modern theories of business cycles attribute cyclical fluctuations to cumulative shocks and disturbances that continuously buffet the economy. In other words, without shocks there are no cycles” (Chatterjee 2000, 1). Money and central bank policy is viewed as largely irrelevant with respect to economic expansions and downturns. But, while policy errors do not cause downturns, counter-cyclical policies

---

similar argument in 1997. Salerno (2003) provides a more recent defense of this type of policy.

are counterproductive in that they entail costs in excess of benefits (Prescott 1986, 21 and Chatterjee 1999, 18).

The real business cycle model regards fluctuations in factor productivity as the major source of fluctuations in economic activity. These fluctuations in total factor productivity are usually identified with the ‘Solow residual’. The Solow residual is developed by modeling an economy with competitive markets and constant returns to scale using an aggregate production function of the form  $Q = A(t)f(K,N)$ , where  $A$ , the Solow residual, is a shift parameter representing exogenous technical progress or a productivity shock,  $K$  is a measure of the capital stock, and  $N$  is a measure of labor input (Lewin 1999,76). Proponents conclude that the model can account for about 70% of the post-war business cycle phenomena (Kydland and Prescott 1991). But critics contend there is “no independent corroborating evidence for the large technology shocks that are assumed to drive business cycles” (Stadler 1994, 1751). In particular, the model supplies neither a satisfactory theoretical explanation, nor an empirical/historical corroboration of the concept of a “negative technology shock”.

A capital-based macroeconomic model provides some possible answers. What is identified as a technology shock in the highly aggregated production function model may be better modeled in a capital-based macroeconomics framework as a change in the *structure of production*. If the above specified production function is incomplete, if it fails to identify all relevant inputs, then the shift factor  $A(t)$  picks up the effects of the unidentified or omitted inputs. “Identifying and talking about them renders them ‘endogenous’” (Lewin 1999, 76). Clearly, from an Austrian capital-based perspective,

such a production function is incomplete. If capital is viewed as a structure, there is at any point in time, not just one technology known by all and used by all, but a multitude of technologies either in use or available for use. Rothbard ([1963] 2000, 71) clearly demonstrates that time preference and available saving limit not only the amount of investment, but also the type of capital goods and technologies. The capital-based framework makes clear the strong link between investment and technological change. New knowledge cannot affect production until there is investment in new capital goods and often new 'human capital' that makes use of the new knowledge. With high time preferences and limited saving, investments are, in general, production plans designed to meet more immediate needs. Investment projects are shorter, less labor saving, and/or less durable. The complex combination of resources that makes up the structure of production is less productive. With lower time preferences, production plans provide for greater future provision. Investment projects are on average longer, more labor saving, and/or more durable. In broad aggregate measures the results of such investment choices should show up as increased total factor productivity, the 'shock factor' in the real business cycle literature.

Growth becomes unsustainable when it is not consistent with underlying preferences and resource availability. As such, it must be policy-induced, not preference-induced, growth. Garrison (2001, 76) illustrates a non-sustainable growth process by modeling the path of an economy responding to a credit expansion initiated by a central bank. If the economy is at full employment when a credit expansion begins, unsustainable growth occurs as the economy begins to temporarily produce outside its

Production Possibility Frontier. While there is an increase in both consumption and investment, the mix of output shifts towards investment without a corresponding change in time preference. The capital-based macro model explains the interactions between money, credit, and investment that set up conditions for unsustainable growth. The credit expansion causes resource misallocation and potential shortages of key resources that make a crisis inevitable once the process of over consumption accompanied by over investment and malinvestment has begun (Garrison 2003). Consumer preferences, augmented by an interest rate induced over-consumption, are pulling resources into a shorter structure of production while the credit expansion is attempting to attract resources to support a longer production structure. The resource base is ultimately not sufficient to allow completion of both structures simultaneously. The predicted pattern of economic activity including the time related subcomponents is consistent with the stylized facts reported in the real business cycle literature (Romer 2001, 170).

Cycle-like phenomena may be explained by random productivity shocks that may be positive (growth enhancing) or negative (growth impeding). If there is no credit creation, the fluctuations around trend are, as argued by real business cycle theorists, actually optimal or equilibrium adjustments to continuous positive and negative shocks to the economy. But if the process is initiated by creation of money and credit, the underlying capital-based theory provides an *a-priori* explanation of what is picked up in the data and interpreted as the associated productivity shocks — the positive shock is the lengthening of the structure and the negative shock is the subsequent contraction associated with the bust. Money and credit expansion rather than being neutral and

benign is the causal factor. The economy experiences not just fluctuations, but a boom-bust cycle.

This is not the only way central bank intervention can create a tendency towards unsustainable growth. Garrison (2001, 57-84) provides a step-by-step graphical presentation illustrating how a different sustainable growth process might originate. A real positive technology shock can increase the demand for loanable funds. Investment increases as does the natural rate of interest and the quantity of saving. Growth associated with the new technological possibilities can be consistent with underlying tastes and resource constraints and hence can be sustainable.

The positive productivity shocks may be exogenous. But if banks, as is likely with a fractional reserve system and a central bank targeting interest rates, respond to the higher demand for credit by expanding the supply of money and credit and thus keeping the interest rate below the new higher natural rate<sup>2</sup>, the expansion that accompanies the economy's response to the shock leads to a mix of economic growth that is partly sustainable, the growth attributable to the productivity shock, and growth that is unsustainable, additional growth in investment and GDP that is attributable solely to the credit expansion.

---

<sup>2</sup> Hayek was one of the first to make a similar argument, "But it is above all for reasons of competition that the bank which first feels the effect of the increased demand for credit cannot afford to reply by putting up interest charges; for it would risk losing its best customers to other banks which had not yet experienced a similarly increased demand for credits. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the bank, or banks which are first to feel the effects of the new credit requirements will be forced to satisfy these even at the cost of reducing their liquidity" (Hayek[1933] 1966, 173). With a fiat currency and an operating federal funds market, extension of additional loans in the face of higher demand for credit at current interest rates is accomplished with limited sacrifice of liquidity. The lending bank needs to borrow not the full amount of the loan, but just sufficient additional reserves to meet its reserve requirement. If such operations put upward pressure on the federal funds rate, the central bank committed to an interest rates target will provide the additional reserves.

Whenever economic growth is augmented by credit creation, a clear crisis will eventually develop in the economy because of inconsistent production plans. Those attempting to lengthen the production structure find that demand may not materialize in the necessary later stages as those attempting to shorten the structure (those responding to rising consumer demand) demand a different capital/resource mix than the mix being provided by the developing longer structure. In addition to a slack demand in some sectors, input prices are likely to increase due to the increased competition from early stages. Malinvestment becomes apparent as some businesses are caught in this squeeze between a slack demand for output and higher input prices. Plans cannot be completed as anticipated. Production may be cut back or discontinued altogether.

However, those businesses attempting to respond directly to higher consumer demand may find their plans thwarted by a lack of needed complementary resources. Labor released from the declining early stages may not be easily absorbed into the expanding later stages of production as the necessary complementary capital goods may not be readily available, if, as is likely, some of the capital goods created during the boom are not immediately useful in the expanding industries.

### **III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS**

Figures 1 and 2 show Real GDP from 1973 to 2003 for the U.S and 1960 through 2001 for Japan. Both countries experienced significantly above trend GDP numbers and higher growth rates (as shown in tables 1 and 2). In both countries, the breakout growth was followed by a recession – a bust. The data for the U.S appear especially compatible with a positive technology shock circa the mid 1990s. GDP spurts significantly above

trend and, even accounting for the recession, remains significantly above trend. We are, however, unaware of any historical event that explains the apparent negative productivity shock associated with the decline in Real GDP and actual growth rates. But such an effect is predicted by the capital-based macroeconomic model.

[Figure 1]

[Figure 2]

While the data for Japan shows a similar pattern in the mid 1980s. It is harder to make the case for a significant external productivity shock. Japan's Real GDP spurts above trend as its growth rate increases (see Table 1), but following the observed bust, Real GDP returns to trend for several years before collapsing below trend in the late 1990s. No model besides the capital-based macroeconomic model predicts both the positive and the negative shocks that the Japanese economy appears to have suffered.

The pattern for Japan fits the credit creation as an initiating factor of boom-bust rather than the productivity shock accompanied by credit creation hypothesized by *The Economist*. Figure 3 reinforces this interpretation. A pickup in Lagged M2 growth is coincident with the pickup in growth in Real GDP.

Further evidence for a boom-bust pattern for the U.S. is provided by Lansing (2003). Business fixed investment expanded at a rate during the boom (1996-to 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000) that exceeded the expansion rate based on historical averages for an upturn, “an average compound rate of 10% per year—about 2.5% faster than the growth

[Figure 3]

rate of the U.S. economy as a whole” (Lansing 2003, 2). Reinforcing the analysis of Callahan and Garrison (2003) and consistent with our mixed shock analysis, Lansing (2) continues:

Much of the surge in business investment during the late 1990s was linked to computers and information technology. During these years, measured productivity growth picked up, inflation remained low and the unemployment rate declined. Such observations were often cited as evidence of a permanent structural change—one that portended faster trend growth in the years ahead. ...

It is now clear that the investment boom of the late 1990s was overdone. Firms vastly overspent in acquiring new technology and in building new productive capacity—with an attendant increase in employee headcount—in an effort to satisfy a level of demand that proved to be unsustainable.

Figure 4 and Figure 5 provide additional support for the technology shock in the mid 1990s. The trend line established from the 1970s shows Real GDP above trend following the recession and slow recovery. A trend using post 1990 data only shows a clear break from the pre-1990 data and clearly shows a collapse below the new trend following the recession. The pickup during the recovery still has real GDP below the new trend. In Figure 5 money and credit growth as measured by MZM accelerates after the apparent growth pick beginning in late 1995.

[Figure 4]

[Figure 5]

#### **IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

The immediately relevant policy implications of the capital-based model and its findings presented here are quite simple and straightforward. Expansionary monetary policy is the “prime mover”, the causal force that drives business cycles. Contrary to

beliefs widely held by both theoretical economists and policy makers, expanding the money supply sets in motion harmful economic patterns regardless of the present health of the economy or the observed rates of inflation. Lessening or eliminating the incidence of cycles requires that central banks refrain from engaging in such expansions.

While the most developed part of a capital-based macroeconomics, the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory predicts the frequently observed boom-bust pattern in economic activity, the capital-based model is underdeveloped relative to the aftermath of a boom. Can economic policy replace and or supplement market adjustments to make the recessions less severe and recovery stronger? Garrison (1996 and 2001, 224-31) provides an answer for stimulus during recovery. Such a policy creates a mixed economy similar to our technology shock plus credit creation model. Growth includes both a sustainable and unsustainable elements. The recovery is stronger, but the seeds are sown for the next bust.

Work needs to be done on the implications of credit creation that begins during the recession, but before recovery has begun. For the first time in U.S economic history the economy went into a recession despite a massive reflation attempt. This has created according to Puplava (2003), an economy...

...still plagued by a plethora of excesses of imbalances leftover from the 1990s, which have yet to work themselves off. Furthermore, the Fed has been fueling these excesses by its policy of flooding the markets with liquidity. All that has managed to do is create additional bubbles in real estate, mortgages, the bond market, and consumer consumption. Instead of creating healthy balanced growth in the economy it has created more imbalances and bubbles in the financial markets. This will not only prolong the recovery process, but also makes it more severe when it inevitably corrects.

The restructuring of the economy requires a realignment of relative prices and wages and a movement of capital resources and labor from the areas where demand had been artificially created by credit expansion to sectors of the economy where demand is consistent with underlying preferences. The crisis—the recession—is the “necessary corrective process by which the market liquidates the unsound investments of the boom and redirects resources from capital goods to consumer goods industries”(Rothbard, 2000, xxvii). How long this adjustment takes is more of an historical rather than a theoretical problem. Rothbard (2000, 14) explains, “Since factors must shift from the higher to the lower orders of production, there is inevitable ‘frictional’ unemployment in a depression, but it need not be greater than unemployment attending any other large shift in production.” The adjustment can be quick and the unemployment temporary if markets are allowed to work during the necessary period of liquidation and restructuring. What then causes or leads to a prolonged recession or slow recovery? Rothbard (2000, 14) provides a clear answer, “Unemployment will progress beyond the ‘frictional’ stage and become really severe and lasting only if wage rates are kept artificially high and are prevented from falling. If wages are kept above the free-market level that clears the demand for and supply of labor, laborers will remain permanently unemployed.”

Are business cycles more or less severe, and the economy more or less volatile, today than in the past. Guo (2003) provides evidence for a decline in volatility post 1962. A study by Stock and Watson (2002) examines three different hypotheses relative to the perceived decline. They indicate that 20-30 percent of reduced volatility in the U.S. economy could be explained by 'improved monetary policy' with most of the rest

attributed to smaller shocks.

It may be true that post Volcker monetary policy with a greater emphasis on control of inflation and price stability is an improvement on the monetary policy pre natural rate theory where the focus was more on employment, but as the recent boom-bust illustrates there is room for improvement.

Though modern experiments with “inflation targeting” as a guide for monetary policy may have lessened its tendency to set cycles in motion, such policy making still erroneously concerns itself with the symptoms rather than the causes of macroeconomic ills. Policy regimes that target interest rates are far worse, as they mask the true nature of central bank action, delude politicians and the public, and automate the kind of money supply fluctuations that drive cyclical behavior. Superior to both of these alternatives is a system of money-growth targeting, specifically a target of zero growth in the monetary base. Interest rates would become market prices. With interest rates under the discipline of the market rather than the whims of central bankers, the kind of systemic money market distortions that cause boom-bust cycles would all but cease to exist.

Hayek (1979, 17) was premature in abandoning his earlier arguments about the harmful effects of money and credit growth in a growing economy for his more pragmatic approach in the 70s that "(t)hough monetary policy must prevent wide fluctuations in the quantity of money or in the volume of the income stream, the effect on employment must not be its dominating consideration. The primary aim must again become the stability of the value of money." A capital-based macroeconomics clearly explains why instability will still be a significant problem in such a monetary policy

environment and provides the foundations for monetary reform that would make the economy even less volatile.

### REFERENCES

- Callahan, Gene and Garrison, Roger W. 2003. "Does the Austrian Business Cycle Theory Help Explain the Dot-Com Boom and Bust?" *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 67-98.
- Chatterjee, Satyajit. 2000. "From Cycles to Shocks: Progress in Business Cycle Theory." *Business Review*, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, March: 1-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999. "Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Policies?" *Business Review*, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, January/February: 17-27.
- Cochran, John P. 2001. "Capital-Based Macroeconomics: Recent Developments and Extensions of Austrian Business Cycle Theory." *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics*, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 17-25.
- Cochran, John P. and Glahe Fred R. 1999. *The Hayek-Keynes Debate: Lessons for Current Business Cycle Research*. Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Cochran, John P., Call, Steven T. and Glahe, Fred R. 2003. "Austrian Business Cycles: Variation on a Theme." *The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 67-73.
- The Economist*. September 28, 2002. "The Unfinished Recession: A Survey of the World Economy."
- Hayek, Friedrich A. 1933. *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle*. Clifton, New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley reprint 1966. Original German 1929.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979. *Unemployment and Monetary Policy: Government as Generator of the "Business Cycle"*. San Francisco: The Cato Institute.
- Garrison, Roger W. Forthcoming "Overconsumption and Forced Saving in the Mises-Hayek Theory of the Business Cycle." *History of Political Economy*
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001. *Time and Money: The Macroeconomics of Capital Structure*. London and New York: Routledge.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. " 'Friedman's Plucking Model': Comment." *Economic Inquiry*, 34(4): 799-802.
- Gordon, Robert J. 2003. *Macroeconomics* 9<sup>th</sup> ed. Boston: Addison Wesley.
- Guo, Hui. 2003. "The Less Volatile Economy." *National Economic Trends*. October.
- Higgs, Robert. 1995. "Austrian Economics and the New Economic History." *Austrian Economics Newsletter* (Summer): 2-3
- Jordan, Jerry L. 2001. "Money, Central Banking, and Monetary Policy in the Global Financial Arena." *The Independent Review*, vol. VI, no. 1 (Summer): 41-57.
- Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. 1991. "Hours and Employment Variation in Business Cycle Theory." *Economic Theory* 1: 63-81.
- Lansing, Kevin J. 2003. "Growth in the Post-Bubble Economy." *FRBSF Economic Letter*, Number 2003-17 (June 20): 1-3
- Lewin, Peter. 1999. *Capital In Disequilibrium: The Role of Capital in a Changing World*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Mises, Ludwig von. 1966. *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.

- Prescott, Edward C. 1986. "Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement." *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review*, Fall, 9-22.
- Puplava, Jim. 2003. "The 'OK' [but fictional] Economy." September 12.  
<http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/oldupdates/2003/0912.htm>
- Romer, David. 2001. *Advanced Macroeconomics* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boston: McGraw Hill.
- Rothbard, Murray N. 2000. [\*America's Great Depression\*](#). Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. *Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles*. Los Angeles: Nash Publishing.
- Salerno, Joseph T. 2003. "An Austrian Taxonomy of Deflation—With Applications to the U.S. Economy." *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics*, vol. 6 (winter), 83-111.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001. "Does the Concept of Secular Growth Have a Place in Capital-Based Macroeconomics." *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics*, vol 4, no. 3, pp. 43-61.
- Selgin, George A. 1997. *Less Than Zero: The Case for A Falling Price Level in a Growing Economy*. Holbart Papers, vol. 132. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Stadler, George W. 1994. "Real Business Cycles." *Journal of Economic Literature*, XXXII (December): 1750-1783.
- Stock, James and Watson, Mark. 2002. "Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?" In Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds. *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*:

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 159-218.

Table 1: Japan 1981-1992<sup>3</sup>

Year	Growth rate: Real GDP	Growth rate: Labor Productivity	Growth rate: M2	Rate of Inflation	Long term interest rate
1981	3.1	3.05	10.7	4.9	8.38
1982	3.1	2.17	7.6	2.7	8.29
1983	2.3	1.06	6.9	1.9	7.81
1984	3.8	2.53	6.9	2.3	7.32
1985	4.2	4.26	8.9	2.0	6.49
1986	3.1	2.05	9.3	0.6	5.15
1987	4.5	3.55	11.2	0.1	5.02
1988	6.5	4.89	9.8	0.7	4.79
1989	5.3	4.44	11.8	2.2	5.13
1990	5.3	5.25	8.2	3.1	6.96
1991	3.0	2.78	2.5	3.2	6.34
1992	0.9	1.53	-0.1	1.7	5.33

---


<sup>3</sup> Data from Gordon 2003, Appendix B, A9.

Table 2: United States 1990-2001<sup>4</sup>

Year	Growth rate: Real GDP	Growth rate: Natural Real GDP	Growth rate: Labor Productivity	Growth rate: M2	Rate of Inflation	Long term interest rate
1990	1.8	2.6	1.16	5.5	3.8	9.3
1991	-0.5	2.7	1.15	3.7	3.7	8.8
1992	3.0	2.7	3.7	1.9	2.3	8.1
1993	2.7	2.7	1.5	1.1	2.5	7.2
1994	4.0	2.7	1.29	1.4	2.0	8.0
1995	2.7	2.7	0.98	2.0	2.2	7.6
1996	3.6	3.2	2.5	4.8	1.9	7.4
1997	4.4	3.5	1.99	4.9	2.0	7.3
1998	4.3	3.5	2.6	7.3	1.2	6.5
1999	4.1	3.5	2.35	7.6	1.5	7.0
2000	4.1	3.5	2.92	6.1	2.2	7.6
2001	1.2	3.5	1.3	7.2	2.2	7.1

---


<sup>4</sup> Data from Gordon 2003, Appendix A, A3.

Figure 1<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Real GDP (chain weighted, seasonally adjusted) for Figures 1, 4, and 5 is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The MZM data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

**Figure 2<sup>6</sup>**

Japan real GDP 1960 through 2001  
with linear trend



<sup>6</sup> Data for Figures 2 and 3 from Gordon 2003, Appendix B, A9.


**Figure 3**

Japan: Output growth vs. 1-year-lagged Money Supply growth



**Figure 4**

US real GDP 1973q2 through 2003q2  
split at 1993q2  
with extrapolated linear trends "before and after"



**Figure 5**

Output growth vs. Money Supply growth  
in the US through the 90's boom

